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Abstract 
In many business negotiations, negotiators fail to identify and consequently exploit the 
integrative potential that underlies their interests and positions, due to cognitive biases 
preventing clear information processing. Such biases can be overcome through the intervention 
of external parties. This study explores perceptions of a new form of external intervention un 
negotiations to overcome cognitive biases and reach integrative agreements: third party direct 
intervention. This study contributes first to the understanding of challenges and solutions to 
reaching integrative agreements; second, to increasing knowledge about individual differences in 
negotiation; third, to developing a novel methodological approach to study negotiations by 
creating and validating a case scenario using vignettes. Based on data collected from a sample of 
fifty-six experienced managers, findings show that this form of intervention increased the 
creation of value, fairness and the likelihood of reaching an agreement. Individual differences 
were found in terms of personality traits, gender, and education. 
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Overcoming judgmental biases in negotiations: a scenario-based survey analysis on 
third party direct intervention 
1. Introduction 
As businesses and their managers are increasingly engaging in negotiations of strategic 
importance due to the growing pressures from the economic downturn and globalized 
competition, they need to understand how to create and deliver value to a broader set of parties 
involved in such negotiations. This means reaching agreements that offer win-win solutions to an 
enlarged and diverse audience, which often includes stakeholders at large. For example, in 2009 
Fiat, the Italian carmaker, decided to partner with Chrysler, an almost bankrupt firm at that time. 
They had to negotiate with a large and heterogeneous set of parties which included stakeholders 
such as the US Government and the Unions, to integrate contending interests and finally find a 
win-win agreement who not only saved both companies from a deep crisis but also allowed them 
to create a competitive advantage (Caputo, 2015). This type of negotiation is called integrative or 
win-win due to the possibility, if successful, of benefiting all parties involved through a higher 
joint gain (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2014; Ogliastri & Quintanilla, 2016). Understanding 
how integrative agreements, and consequently higher profit and satisfaction, can be achieved in 
negotiations would have a significant impact not only for organizations and their stakeholders, 
but also for the global economy as a whole. 
Although most negotiations are seen to include the potential for achieving integrative 
solutions, from both a theoretical and practical perspective such solutions are traditionally 
considered to be highly complex to achieve (Lewicki et al., 2014). Such complexities often arise 
due to the arithmetic of negotiations, that is the addition and subtraction of parties, issues and 
interests within a negotiation (Sebenius, 1983). Indeed, integrative negotiations often involve 
multiple issues and parties, which per se complicates the relationships and the reaching of an 
agreement (Kramer, 1991). Thus, behavioral researchers have revealed that negotiators are often 
inefficient in the sense that they fail to reach integrative agreements, although these agreements 
are frequently available, mutually beneficial, and therefore desirable solutions (Moran & Ritov, 
2007; Neale & Bazerman, 1991). Recent literature reviews (Caputo, 2013a; Thompson, Nadler, 
& Lount, 2006) evidenced that the main reasons for such inefficiencies reside in the negotiators’ 
inability to see the integrative potential due to the interplay of several cognitive heuristics that 
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bias negotiators’ judgment and decision-making (Larrick & Wu, 2007; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; 
Zartman, 2008).  
It remains ambiguous how negotiators can overcome cognitive and judgmental biases 
(Caputo, 2013a) and among the many proposed solutions a recurrent one is the inclusion of 
external views at the table. This is often achieved through mediation (Stevens, 1963) and 
facilitation (Walton & McKersie, 1965), processes typical of the third party dispute resolution 
approach (Lewicki, Weiss, & Lewin, 1992), where parties external to a conflict take actions to 
resolve it or restore effective negotiation. Idiosyncratic of such interventions is the displacement 
of interests, as the third party — acting as a consultant — is more interested in reaching any 
agreement than reaching a good and lasting agreement (Lewicki et al., 1992). Another approach 
calls for the intervention of parties with more tangible and stronger interests in the achievement, 
implementation and consequences of a negotiated agreement, parties that transition from external 
to internal by joining the negotiations (Sebenius, 1983). For the purpose of this study, such an 
approach is referred as third party direct intervention, where a third party is originally a 
stakeholder to the negotiation — a social stakeholder, a potential industrial partner, or a 
competitor — who joins it as a party (Caputo, 2013b).  
In a recent review of the literature, Caputo (2013a) highlighted that, although most 
negotiations in business and political context have a potential for creating value and are 
performed by more than two parties, the role of biases in integrative negotiations and multilateral 
negotiations was under-researched in the literature, concluding that further research should 
investigate how bringing in new parties could help de-bias the negotiation process. Indeed, 
despite a growing and multidisciplinary interest of research in integrative negotiations (Caputo, 
2012; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Schei, 2008; Traavik, 2011), most research in negotiation 
focuses on distributive bargaining in two party settings, often through controlled experiments 
with student samples (Chan & Ng, 2016; Giacomantonio, De Dreu, & Mannetti, 2010; Patton & 
Balakrishnan, 2010; Traavik, 2011). Often in conference presentations, when asked about the 
limitations of such an approach, these researchers’ main justification is related to the 
complexities of analyzing integrative negotiations, where a multitude of parties, issues and 
interests are at stake (Kramer, 1991). Such an approach has been widely criticized in literature on 
multiple occasions (Herbst & Schwarz, 2011; Pruitt, 2011), and a few studies have started to 
investigate negotiations in a closer-to-reality fashion (Ness & Haugland, 2005; Ogliastri & 
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Quintanilla, 2016; Volkema, 2004). In line with such a stream of research, this study proposes a 
novel theoretical and methodological approach to investigating managers’ perceptions of the 
direct intervention of a third party through the original development of a case scenario. 
Specifically, this article aims at answering the following research questions: can third party 
direct intervention help in overcoming biases in negotiations? How do managers perceive this 
role? Do managers and negotiators perceive this form of cooperation as fair and effective? In 
doing so, the study contributes to the development of a more practical approach to studying 
negotiation and to a better understanding of the process of adding parties to a strategic 
negotiation to achieve an integrative agreement.  
The next section presents the theoretical background and propositions being tested. The 
methodology section is followed by the presentation of results and discussion of the main 
findings. Finally, conclusions and implications for future research are addressed. 
2. Background and propositions 
2.1. Integrative Negotiations 
Negotiation is commonly defined as a process through which two or more parties reach a 
needed joint decision, while having different interests and preferences (Lax & Sebenius, 1986; 
Raiffa, Richardson, & Metcalfe, 2002). Due to the interdependence that takes place in multi-
actor decision processes (Lewicki et al., 2014), negotiation processes and outcomes are affected 
by all decisions made by all the parties involved, which contain their individual differences, 
attitudes, prejudices and assumptions (Chan & Ng, 2016). Negotiations are different from other 
group decision making processes because parties are driven by both the motivation to achieve 
their own interests and, at the same time, by a we-rationality needed to cooperate with the other 
party to reach a joint decision (Traavik, 2011). The process is replete with dilemmas, and the 
parties involved consistently misinterpret the situation or their counterparts’ interests (Caputo, 
2013a). In doing so, they may be motivated to approach the negotiation with a more competitive 
mind-set, using influence tactics and misleading behaviors, treating the situation as distributive.  
Traditionally, negotiations have been categorized as distributive and integrative, on the 
basis of the characteristics of the process and outcome. Negotiation processes include 
negotiators’ behaviors, tactics, attitudes, cognitions, emotions and motivations; while negotiation 
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outcomes include the features of the agreement (see Lewicki et al., 2014 for a close examination 
of the subject). Distributive negotiations, also known as win-lose or fixed-sum, refer to the joint 
decision making process to distribute scarce resources among the parties involved. The 
negotiation process is usually competitive in nature; negotiators have diametrically opposed 
interests and attempt to get the larger share, such as an amount of raw material, money or the 
like, by deploying win-lose strategies and tactics. The purpose of the negotiation is to claim 
value, that is to do whatever it takes to claim the largest piece of the resources (Lax & Sebenius, 
1986). A classic example is the ultimatum game (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982), 
where two parties have to agree on how to divide a fixed sum of money. In contrast, integrative 
negotiations, also known as win-win or variable-sum, refer to a situation where it is possible for 
the parties involved to achieve their goals simultaneously. The negotiation process is usually 
collaborative and aimed at problem solving; often interests and goals are linked “so that one 
person’s goal achievement helps others to achieve their goals” (Lewicki et al., 2014, p. 11) and 
the agreement “incorporates, and reconciles, the parties’ interests and produces high joint 
benefit” (Traavik, 2011, p. 192). The purpose of the negotiation is to create value (Lax & 
Sebenius, 1986), that is to do whatever it takes to meet mutual objectives, either by identifying 
more resources or finding unique ways to reconfigure, share or coordinate the use of available 
resources (Lewicki et al., 2014). It is generally said that most real negotiations contain the 
possibility of reaching an integrative agreement (Lewicki et al., 2014; Traavik, 2011). Moreover, 
integrative agreements, by providing higher joint outcomes, satisfaction and quality process, are 
considered to be preferable in business negotiations where a long-term relationship is particularly 
important (Lewicki et al., 2014). At the same time and despite the academic, professional, and 
educational efforts, integrative agreements are highly difficult to reach (Lewicki et al., 2014). 
Why do negotiators often fail to reach them? A possible explanation comes from the studies on 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1972) and the subsequent cognitive biases which alter the decision 
making processes of negotiators.  
2.2. Cognitive biases in Negotiations 
Stemming from Herbert Simon’s work, a wide body of literature has addressed the issue of 
cognitive biases affecting decision-making processes, trying to explain why human 
misperceptions can occur. According to cognitive studies (e.g., Neale & Bazerman, 1985; 
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Thompson & Hastie, 1990), negotiation processes can be better understood when they are 
viewed as cognitive decision-making tasks, where individuals construct mental representations 
of the conflict situation, the issues, and the other parties’ positions. This involves the 
examination of how negotiators’ information-processing capabilities influence negotiators’ 
judgment formation and behavioral processes. In this regard, the aim is to identify the faulty 
assumptions of negotiators’ cognition during negotiation processes. 
Individuals use rules of thumb, or heuristics, to help themselves make judgments. Newell 
and Simon (1972) defined the heuristics as those cognitive shortcuts that the human brain tends 
to use when its decision-making process is limited in terms of time and availability of data. 
Although they can be very helpful, their use often produces incorrect or partially correct 
judgments due to systematic biases (Bazerman & Moore, 2013). A recent systematic literature 
review identified that only 11 biases have been studied with reference to negotiation contexts 
(see Caputo, 2013a for a close examination of the subject). For example, Thompson and Hastie 
(1990) identified the fixed-pie bias, where negotiators inaccurately assume their counterparts’ 
interests are diametrically opposed to their own, even when they are not. This fixed-pie 
perception often concludes with a faulty decision because most situations provide an opportunity 
for joint gain. How can negotiators be helped to overcome judgmental biases that prevent them 
from reaching integrative agreements?  
2.3. The Third Direct Party Intervention 
A possible solution to negotiators’ inefficiencies is the external intervention of a party that 
would bring novel issues and approaches to help negotiators achieve integrative solutions (e.g., 
Caputo, 2013a). Sebenius (1983) was among the first to theorize the addition or subtraction of 
parties at the negotiators’ table to move the dynamics among interests toward a clearer path for 
an integrative solution. His central proposition was that issues and parties should not be regarded 
as static elements but instead as dynamic variables. On the one hand, dynamism is an implicit 
and natural evolution of the process itself; on the other, the parties can strategically guide it. This 
manipulation, known as Negotiation Arithmetic, lets parties change the elements of the structure 
in a strategic way. Similarly, the third party dispute resolution approach, which has been 
stimulated by concerns about more effective resolution of labor and international disputes 
(Jackson, 1952), studies the actions taken by parties external to a conflict to resolve it or to 
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restore effective negotiation (Lewicki et al., 1992). In this case, external mediators and 
facilitators can intervene, as consultants, to assist parties to negotiate.  
The main difference between the approach of Sebenius and third party dispute resolution is 
related to the interests of the intervening party. In the latter, the parties are totally external, do not 
have a strong partisan position on the substantive issues in dispute and have their interests rooted 
in the execution of a consulting activity. While in the former, the external party soon becomes an 
internal party, joining the negotiation and having a strong interest in the negotiation outcome and 
process. For the purpose of this study, we call such an approach Third Party Direct Intervention 
(TPDI), defined as a situation where parties originally external to a negotiation enter the 
negotiation with a strong interest in the achievement, implementation and consequences of an 
agreement (Caputo, 2013b). In this sense, a third party is a stakeholder to the negotiation; for 
example, they can be a social stakeholder of the company, a potential industrial partner, or a 
competitor.  
A primary justification for a third party to have a strong interest in the solution of the 
conflict has been addressed by Karambayya and Brett (1989). They focused on perceptions of 
fairness and the role of managers in handling disputes, demonstrating negative outcomes when 
disputants worked the conflict out themselves. Regarding third party dispute resolution, Keashly 
et al. (1993) stressed how mediators, for example, were also found to be subject to cognitive 
biases and limitations in achieving integrative solutions, they emphasized how the parties 
themselves have difficulties in shifting their thinking and behavior towards a collaborative, win-
win orientation. More recently, Ackermann and Eden (2011) found a positive correlation 
between the introduction of a subject capable of helping collective cognition and an agreement’s 
implementation and stability. Therefore, it is proposed: 
Proposition 1: The TPDI should be associated with a less biased interpretation of 
information. 
Proposition 2: The TPDI should be associated with an increase in the perception of fairness 
of information disclosure. 
The key determinant for the success of the third party intervention appears to be the 
possible linkages between the interests of the newly formed set of parties as a consequence of the 
intervention. Indeed, it has been found that encouraging the entry of these parties is likely to 
reinforce existing coalitions or help to form one, thanks to leverage due to links with new 
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interests and issues (Murninghan & Brass, 1991; Raiffa et al., 2002). Thus, it is proposed that as 
a result of the strategic addition of parties the negotiation can benefit thanks to connections  
between issues and interests. This view identifies that the addition of parties to the negotiation 
can be beneficial provided they have tangible interests or can materially influence the 
negotiation. Such an intervention, by stimulating the adoption of behaviors aimed at a creating 
value perspective, allows the negotiations to move from a distributive setting to an integrative 
setting. Therefore, it is proposed: 
Proposition 3: The TPDI should be associated with a higher creating value approach rather 
than claiming value. 
Proposition 4: The TPDI should be considered to be helpful to overcome judgmental biases. 
Proposition 5: The TPDI should be considered to be helpful to reach a negotiated solution. 
Proposition 6: TPDI should be associated with higher confidence in the possibility of 
reaching a negotiated solution. 
 
- - - PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE - - - 
 
2.4. Individual differences 
For the purpose of this study, individual differences are referred to differences in 
demographics (i.e. gender, education, and experience) and personality factors. Personality has 
been defined as “consistency over time in a person’s behaviors when that individual is placed 
again in the same situation” (Sharma, Bottom, & Elfenbein, 2013, p. 301). The personality 
factors that make up the “Big Five” are dispositional categories under which a variety of specific 
traits may be subsumed (Barry & Friedman, 1998). According to Barrick and Mount (1991), 
these five factors include: extraversion, which is associated with being sociable, assertive, 
talkative and active; agreeableness, which is associated with being courteous, flexible, trusting, 
co-operative and tolerant;  conscientiousness, which is associated with being careful, responsible 
and organized; emotional stability, which is associated with being calm, even-tempered, and less 
likely to feel tense or rattled; openness to experience, which is associated with being imaginative, 
curious, original and open-minded. 
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The stream of studies on individual differences in negotiation has a long and contradictory 
history, it led to an irrelevance consensus of a limited role of such differences, which has been 
considered to stem from an early narrative based on limited data (Sharma et al., 2013). 
Researchers have examined the impact of individual differences on negotiation processes and 
outcomes on several occasions (e.g., Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Volkema, 2004). Thompson 
(1990), in a review of the literature on negotiation behavior and outcomes, claimed that 
personality and individual differences played a minimal role in determining bargaining styles and 
outcomes in dyadic negotiations. The impact of personality on negotiation has not been 
adequately studied, and researchers may have prematurely dismissed personality effects as topics 
for research (Barry & Friedman, 1998; De Dreu, 2003; Sharma et al., 2013; Volkema, 2004). In a 
meta-analysis based on more than a thousand articles, Sharma and colleagues (2013) argued and 
demonstrated that the consensus is paradoxical and premature, due to the vast research 
“demonstrating the predictive power of individual difference variables across a wide range of 
other organizational settings” (p. 294). By analyzing a wide range of individual difference 
variables, including personality, emotional intelligence and risk propensity, they concluded by 
recognizing the “potentially far-reaching role of individual differences in predicting negotiation 
outcomes” (p. 322). It is reasonable to assume that personality influences negotiation processes 
since people exhibit a great deal of consistency across situations, which suggests that personality 
is an important influence on social behavior. Therefore, it is proposed: 
Proposition 7: Individual differences should be found in terms of personality, education and 
experience, on perceptions about the negotiation process and TPDI. 
Proposition 8: Individual differences should be found in terms of personality, education and 
experience, on perceptions about the negotiation outcome and TPDI. 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Aim and design of the study 
This study aims at investigating whether a third party direct intervention can help 
overcome negotiators’ biases through managers’ perceptions of such an intervention. The study 
sought a method that would use real managers, would not be influenced by prior respondent 
behavior and would allow isolating focal constructs. Hence, an experimental task was chosen. 
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The task involved participants being presented with a fictional case study, in the form of 
vignettes that represented a negotiation between two companies, with an external party 
intervention later in the story, and then being asked to respond to questions related to their 
perceptions of the situation. The study has been designed to research the issue on two different 
levels. On the one hand, the analysis covers the general idea of the third party effect on the 
negotiation. On the other hand, the analysis covers how answers might differ across different 
subjects, in terms of background education and experience, gender, and personality traits.  
3.2. Development and pilot of the Case Study 
A fictional case study involving a negotiation between two companies and a public 
institution, the third party, has been originally developed and validated by borrowing the 
validation technique suggested for scenario-based role playing experiments using vignettes 
(Rungtusanatham, Wallin, & Eckerd, 2011). Indeed, this study developed a series of vignettes to 
convey scripted information about the fictional negotiation taking place. The three stages of 
constructing a vignette were adopted, i.e. predesign, design and validation (Rungtusanatham et 
al., 2011). 
Predesign stage. In the predesign stage, the focus was the empirical context in which 
participants would be embedded. The empirical context had to fulfill the following criteria: (a) 
the negotiation should take place in a business context; (b) the negotiation should include the 
possibility of achieving an integrative agreement; (c) negotiators should show cognitive biases 
that prevent them from identifying the integrative solution and mean they reach an impasse; (d) 
an originally external party (TPDI) should enter the negotiation with a strong interest in reaching 
a solution; (e) the TPDI should show the original two negotiators the viability of the integrative 
agreements; (f) the story should be open-ended to allow participants to make a decision. The 
context of two companies negotiating a merger and the intervention of the local government to 
facilitate the negotiation was chosen as the context. This situation is similar to the negotiation 
between Fiat, Chrysler and the US Government in 2009 (Caputo, 2012). 
Design stage. The design stage consists of designing the manipulation procedure and the 
vignettes used to portray the story. Given the aim of investigating the role of TPDI, the 
manipulation took place within the story itself. The case study was designed to be formed by an 
introduction, a first session of negotiation (part A) and a second session of negotiation (part B). 
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The introduction included background information about the negotiation, the companies, and the 
negotiators at the table. Company A is in crisis and risks bankruptcy if it does not find an 
acquirer, company B is interested in acquiring it but is lacking the financial resources to do so. 
Company A is crucial for the economy of its town, therefore the local government is interested in 
the success of the negotiation. Part A included a series of vignettes conveying the introspective 
thoughts of the negotiators (the managers of the two companies) and the dialogue at the 
negotiation table. In this part, the negotiators do not reach an agreement and leave the table 
postponing the negotiation. In the dialogues the negotiators show several cognitive biases, which 
influence their interpretations of the situation. Part B presents the second part of the negotiation 
where unexpectedly the local government enters the negotiation and sits at the table (TPDI). 
Similar to part A, the second part presents a series of vignettes representing what happened 
during the negotiation. The dialogues show the TPDI re-framing many biased statements to 
present the integrative potential of the negotiation. The story ends with a proposal for an 
integrative agreement by the TPDI. During the writing of the case studies five managers were 
informally interviewed to comment on the development of the story.  Table 1 presents some 
extracts of the case study.  
 
- - - PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE - - - 
 
Validation stage. To ensure that the case study was clear, realistic, complete and effective 
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2011), a panel of experts was formed to independently assess the case 
study. The panel included 10 faculty members (average of 18.25 years of experience) at a US 
university who were asked to comment on whether the dialogues showed the desired theoretical 
constructs. Questions in the form of “to what extent do you think this sentence illustrates (name 
of the construct)” were asked, requesting answers on a 5-point Likert scale (1 being the lowest 
and 5 the highest) in order to evaluate the theoretical effectiveness of cognitive biases during the 
case scenario (Mean = 3.8, SD = 1.3). Finally, PhD students from two universities, one in the US 
and one in Italy, were asked to assess the revised case study. Suggestions were incorporated in 
the final version. 
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3.3. Measurement tools 
3.3.1. Measure of personality 
The ten-item personality inventory (TIPI, Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) was used to 
gather information from participants about their personality dimensions. The scale covers 
personality traits according to the five-factor model (FFM, McCrae & Costa, 1987), namely 
extraversion (EXT), agreeableness (AGR), conscientiousness (CON), emotional stability (ES) 
and openness (OPN). The TIPI measures two items for each personality dimension on a 7-point 
Likert scale (Gosling et al., 2003). Several previous studies have validated the scale separately 
(e.g., Caputo, 2014; Ehrhart et al., 2009; Gosling et al., 2003; Volk, Thöni, & Ruigrok, 2011). 
The instrument increases administration efficiency and maintains construct validity; it was 
chosen to reduce transient measurement errors resulting from participant fatigue, frustration, and 
boredom associated with completing several survey instruments in combination with a lengthy 
experimental session (Volk et al., 2011). The alpha reliabilities, reported in Table 2, were very 
similar to the findings by Volk et al. (2011), Ehrhart et al. (2009) and Gosling et al. (2003). With 
only two items per dimension, the relatively low alphas are to be expected as the computation of 
Cronbach’s alpha is a function of the number of scale items.1 Test–retest reliability is therefore a 
more appropriate reliability measure for such brief scales and Gosling et al. (2003) reported test–
retest reliability scores for the five TIPI dimensions over a period of six weeks, indicating that 
the scale provides a stable measure of personality over time. 
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3.3.2. Measures of perceptions on the biased negotiation process 
In order to determine the perceptions of participants of the parties’ behaviors and the 
negotiation process in the case scenario, a 12-item questionnaire was developed to assess four 
factors: Claiming value (CLV), Creating value (CRV), Information fairness (IF), and Biased 
interpretation of information (BII). A 5-point Likert scale was used and participants were asked 
to rate their level of agreement with a statement (1 = “Disagree strongly”, 5 = “Agree strongly”). 
                                                
1 The explanation of the low Alphas and the reliability of the scale can be found on Prof. Gosling’s website at this address: 
http://gosling.psy.utexas.edu/scales-weve-developed/ten-item-personality-measure-tipi/a-note-on-alpha-reliability-and-factor-
structure-in-the-tipi/  
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The reliability of the questionnaire was validated through a Principal Component Factor Analysis 
with Varimax rotation, Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities and correlations analysis. Reliability values 
are presented in Table 3.  
 
- - - PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE - - - 
 
3.3.3. Questionnaire on the role of the Third Party Direct Intervention (TPDI) 
A set of five questions was developed to investigate the role of the TPDI. A 5-point Likert 
scale was used and participants were asked to rate their level of agreement with a statement (1 = 
“Disagree strongly”, 5 = “Agree strongly”). Two questions asked whether participants thought 
the situation was likely to be solved and if the intervention of a third party was useful. Three 
questions asked about the role of the third party, specifically whether it was determinant, whether 
it helped in overcoming judgmental biases and whether they thought it could lead to an 
agreement.  
3.3.4. Demographic information 
Seven closed-ended demographic questions asked for age, gender, nationality, educational 
background, years of working experience, previous formal education or training in negotiation, 
and previous experience in negotiation. 
3.4. Participants and procedure  
Data were collected from 56 participants among experienced management professionals 
(working experience: M = 20.14, SD = 15.62), selected in order to ensure the representativeness 
of the dataset for a study involving managers at different levels. Permission was obtained prior to 
participation in the study and the study took place online on a dedicated website using an ad-hoc 
data collection software developed for the purpose of the study. The study was run in the English 
language, as all participants were required to have international experience and speak English 
fluently. Participants were first presented with demographic questions and the TIPI. Secondly, 
participants were asked to read the first part of the case scenario and then to answer the questions 
about their perceptions of the negotiation process. Thirdly, participants were asked to read the 
second part of the case scenario and then answer again the same questions in reference to this 
second part. Finally, participants were asked to put themselves in the shoes of the main two 
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negotiators and indicate whether they would accept the solution proposed by the third party that 
ended the case scenario. During the survey, the participants could not skip questions nor come 
back to modify a previous answer. Each question was presented to them separately to increase 
participant focus. The average time to complete the survey was approximately 40 minutes.  
3.5. Data analysis 
Data were operationalized and then analyzed with the software SPSS, version 21.0. 
Descriptive statistics and other corresponding statistical measures (including mean comparison, 
correlations, ANOVA and logistic regression) were used to investigate the propositions. 
4. Results 
4.1. Characteristics of participants 
Participants were randomly selected from university institutions and managers’ 
associations distributed across Italy (50.0%), the United States (41.1%) and other European 
Countries (9.0%). A majority were male (51.8%), aged between 23 and 79 (Mean = 44.71, SD = 
15.35), and work experience ranged from 0 to 53 years (Mean = 20.14, SD = 15.62). Work 
experience was highly correlated with age (r = .974, p = .000), thus only the former was included 
in the analyses. A majority of the participants had a master’s degree (53.6%), followed by 
doctoral degrees (26.8%), and bachelor’s degrees or lower (19.6%). A majority of the 
participants had attended a negotiation class (75%) and had relevant experience in negotiations 
(65%). 
4.2. The impact of TPDI on the negotiation process 
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 were to determine whether TPDI affected the negotiation process, 
in terms of a less biased interpretation of information, a higher perception of fairness and a 
creating value approach. Table 4 presents the mean comparisons for the four variables addressing 
the perceptions of participants on the biased negotiation process before and after the TPDI. The 
mean score and comparison tests show that CLV was rated lower and CRV higher after the TPDI 
in the story (p < .000). Similarly IF was rated higher after the intervention (p < .000). BII was 
rated higher but the mean comparisons were not significant. These results show that participants 
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considered TPDI to bring a creative value perspective and fairer perception of the information 
exchange. Thus, P2 and P3 are supported, while P1 is not. 
 
- - - PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE - - - 
 
In order to understand differences among the population in terms of demographic 
characteristics, a series of One-Way ANOVA procedures have been computed by taking into 
consideration the four dimensions and variables: education, gender and experience or education 
in negotiations. No statistically significant differences were found, however it is worth noting 
that education and experience in negotiations showed some differences with reference to 
Information Fairness (F = 2.011, p = .144). 
4.3. The perception on TPDI’s role 
Proposition 4 was to determine whether the TPDI was considered to be helpful in 
overcoming judgmental biases. A question was asked at the end of the case and a vast majority 
of participants (80.4%) rated it as 4 or above (M = 3.98, SD = 0.90). Therefore, P4 was 
supported. 
Propositions 5 and 6 were to determine how managers perceived TPDI, specifically 
whether they perceived it to be helpful in reaching a solution, and whether TPDI was associated 
with higher confidence in the possibility of reaching a solution. Table 4 shows the results of the 
mean ratings for these two questions. The mean scores and comparison tests show that both the 
likelihood for the situation to be solved and the perceived usefulness of TPDI were rated higher 
after the TPDI took place (p < 0.10). Therefore, P5 and P6 were supported. No significant 
differences have been found with reference to personality dimensions and demographic 
characteristics.  
4.4. The output of the case study 
Proposition 7 was to investigate whether individual differences were present at the 
different stages of the analysis on the negotiation process and the perceptions of TPDI. The 
analyses to test P1 to P6 did not support any statistically significant findings for individual 
differences. Therefore, we can conclude that P7 was not confirmed by the data.  
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Proposition 8 was to determine whether individual differences existed in reaching the 
outcome of the negotiation.  Participants were asked whether they would accept the offer from 
the third party at the end of the case if they were in the position of each of the negotiating parties. 
In sixty-seven percent of the cases, participants affirmatively answered both questions, meaning 
an agreement could be reached. A correlation analysis showed a correlation with the perceptions 
of the usefulness of the third party after its intervention (r = .309, p = .021) and with the level of 
information fairness (r = .295, p = .027), which means that people who perceived higher 
information fairness after TPDI are more likely to accept the mediated agreement.  
Table 5 shows the results of the binary logistic regression, where the target variable is the 
“agreement” group. The analysis focuses on results from the bootstrap, whose use is 
recommended in binary logistics to increase internal validity (Steyerberg et al., 2001). The model 
shows a gender effect, namely that the likelihood of reaching an agreement is higher for female 
subjects than male subjects (B = .67, p = .031). People with lower levels of education showed 
more availability to accept the suggested offer (B = -.275, p = .011), and a higher value in 
working experience increase the probability of acceptance of the mediated offer (B = .04, p = 
.000). In terms of personality traits, EXT (B = -.475, p = .000) and ES (B = -.375, p = .001) have 
a negative effect, while AGR (B = .391, p = .024) plays a positive role. Therefore, P8 is 
confirmed. 
 
- - - PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE - - - 
5. Discussion 
This study examined the role of a novel approach to overcoming judgmental biases in 
integrative negotiations, the TPDI, through an experimental task performed by experienced 
managers. The role of third parties in helping to overcome judgmental biases is an under-
researched topic in the field of negotiation and results from previous studies showed that the 
third parties’ intervention in negotiations is seen as a possible solution to impasses caused by 
negotiators’ misperceptions. Third party direct intervention is referred to as an intervention from 
interested entities, originally external, who act as actors in the negotiations. In this view, a third 
party is a subject which cares both about reaching an agreement and implementing it 
successfully. In other words, it cares about the quality of the agreement.  
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Participants in the study judged the TPDI as having an important influence on the 
perceived creating value level and fairness level in the negotiation process, but not on the biased 
interpretation of information. The TPDI, by helping in debriefing the situation and by using 
integrative behaviors, was perceived to have a positive effect, supporting findings from previous 
studies (e.g. Arunachalam, Dilla, Shelley, & Chan, 1998; Lewicki et al., 1992; Raiffa et al., 
2002; Sebenius, 1992). Parties showed the fixed-pie error along the negotiation process, which, 
as predicted, had an effect on the perception of fairness (e.g., Mumpower, Sheffield, Darling, & 
Miller, 2004; Patton & Balakrishnan, 2010; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson & 
Loewenstein, 1992). Thus, the TPDI’s action in the case study involved framing techniques to 
de-bias negotiators. These results are consistent with previous studies analyzing the effects of 
framing on perceptions of fairness (Chang, Cheng, & Trotman, 2008). Although a gender effect 
was found in previous similar studies (Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Kulik & Olekalns, 2012; 
Semnani-Azad & Adair, 2011; Volkema, 2004), participants in this study did not show any 
individual differences in their responses. However, further research should investigate the 
relationship between previous education and experience in negotiation as findings, although not 
significant, show the possibility for such an effect to exist.  
Participants in the study also perceived the TPDI as useful and determinant to overcoming 
judgmental biases, and then leading to an agreement, Moreover, participants showed a change of 
perceptions resulting in an increased positive view on the intervention of an external party after 
the TPDI happened. Finally, participants showed inclination to accept the proposed agreement 
after the TPDI. A correlation was found with previous perceptions on the TPDI. Specifically, the 
acceptance of the agreement was correlated with considerations about how useful the TPDI was 
perceived and information fairness. These findings support previous studies that called for 
external intervention to reach integrative agreements (Conlon, Carnevale, & Ross, 1994; 
Delerue, 2005; Sebenius, 1992). Perception of fairness was largely associated with difficulties in 
reaching an agreement and external parties were seen to overcome such an issue. This study’s 
findings confirm previous studies (Karambayya & Brett, 1989; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992) 
and portray TPDI as an effective countermeasure. 
There are certain individual differences regarding the acceptance of the agreement, namely 
in terms of personality, gender, education and experience. Participants in this study showed a 
gender effect, as predicted by some recent studies (Eriksson & Sandberg, 2012; Kulik & 
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Olekalns, 2012; Semnani-Azad & Adair, 2011). There were more females than males in the 
group of subjects that agreed on the proposal from the third party. People with lower levels of 
education showed more willingness to accept the mediated offer than people with higher 
education, while work experience had a limited effect. Learning and experience have been 
considered to enhance negotiators’ decision-making processes by some scholars (Ritov, 1996; 
Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Others have stated that over time negotiators may become 
overconfident in their negotiating abilities, may put more trust in heuristics, and tend to avoid 
negotiated – and mediated – settlements (Larrick & Wu, 2007).  
Other individual differences were related to personality. Personality has been widely 
studied in negotiation, generating inconsistent support for a personality and negotiation 
relationship. Negotiation researchers have been attempting different methods to build actionable 
knowledge in this area (Sharma et al., 2013). While suggestions regarding the impact of 
personality on negotiations are intuitively appealing, many studies have provided uneven 
evidence for such relationships (Sharma et al., 2013). This inconsistency has made researchers 
skeptical of such relationships and led them to contend that these inconsistencies are partly due 
to the utilization of bargainer variables that are conveniently available, instead of being 
conceptually related to negotiations (Barry & Friedman, 1998; Sharma et al., 2013). 
Several experiments have provided evidence that negotiators make systematic errors in 
personality-trait attributions for the bargaining behaviors of their counterparts. Although basic 
negotiation behavior is highly determined by bargaining positions, negotiators primarily interpret 
their counterpart's behavior in terms of the counterpart's personality, such as his or her level of 
cooperativeness or agreeableness (Morris & Fu, 2001). How involved parties define negotiation 
determines how they approach the negotiation. According to social cognition theory (Morris & 
Fu, 2001), a negotiator's personality affects how the negotiator defines the negotiation situation 
and further forms different understandings. In addition, Ma (2008) presented a model where the 
negotiator's personality is expected to have a direct impact on negotiator cognitions through 
which personality then indirectly affects the negotiator's behaviors and outcomes.  
The personality traits of extraversion, agreeableness and emotional stability showed 
significant interactions with the disposition to accept the suggested agreement, and then to reach 
a negotiated settlement. Extraversion seems to be a predictor for the rejection of the proposal. 
This result is consistent the fact that values in the trait of extraversion have been found to be 
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negatively correlated with the perceptions of information fairness and creating value. Indeed, a 
lower level of perception of fairness has been found to be a predictor for impasse in negotiation 
(Mumpower et al., 2004; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). 
Negotiators high in agreeableness have been found to be best suited to integrative 
negotiations and to prefer negotiation and disengagement tactics as better choices than power 
assertion tactics (Dimotakis, Conlon, & Ilies, 2012). The trait of agreeableness has been found to 
be positively related to styles such as Avoiding and Compromising, and it predicts effective 
negotiation performance (Ana-Paula, Gonzalo, & Damaso, 2012). These results have been 
confirmed by the present study. In fact, subjects willing to accept the mediated proposal, and 
thus reach an agreement, show higher values of agreeableness than those unwilling to.  
Emotional stability is positively related to integrative styles of negotiation (Ana-Paula et 
al., 2012). In this study, subjects with higher values of emotional stability perceived a lower 
fairness in the absence of the third party and higher claiming value tactics after the intervention 
of the third party. Consistent with the characteristics of the trait, it was not found to be associated 
with any change in perceptions. Contradictory to previous studies, emotional stability was 
negatively correlated with the disposition to accept the mediated offer. As with the trait of 
extraversion, the results from the present study are consistent with the previous findings relating 
to information fairness perception. In fact, a lower level of perception of fairness has been found 
to be a predictor for impasse in negotiation (Mumpower et al., 2004; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; 
Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). 
6. Conclusions 
This study investigated managers’ perceptions of third party direct intervention in 
overcoming judgmental biases to reach integrative agreements. Negotiations are essential and 
fundamental moments of life. Therefore, improving negotiation skills, as well as increasing the 
ability to negotiate effectively, is crucial in managerial, political, and business contexts. Simon’s 
bounded rationality (1972) acknowledges that individuals, while attempting to make rational 
decisions, often lack important information and the relevant criteria of problems, and prior 
literature in management and psychology has demonstrated that managers and negotiators do not 
always act rationally. 
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The unique contributions of this study are manifold. First is the understanding of how a 
TPDI in a negotiation is perceived regarding its role in helping to overcome judgmental biases of 
the negotiators. The TPDI was found to have an important influence on the perceived creating 
value level and fairness level in the negotiation process, as well as on the possibility of reaching 
a negotiated settlement, by helping to debrief the situation and by using integrative behavior. 
This intervention also helped the parties to overcome the fixed-pie error, showed throughout the 
negotiation process, which resulted in affecting the perception of fairness. In addition, the vast 
majority of participants perceived the third party direct intervention to be useful and determinant 
in overcoming judgmental biases, and accepted the mediated agreement.  
Second is the contribution to the literature on individual differences, in terms of personality 
and demographics in negotiations. The roles of gender and education were found to be 
controversial. While no gender effect was found with reference to perceptions of TPDI and the 
negotiation process, a gender effect was found with regard to TPDI and the outcome of the 
negotiation, which is an interesting result and an issue to be further researched. Moreover, 
managers’ high values in extraversion and emotional stability reduced the likelihood of reaching 
an agreement, while agreeableness increased it. 
Third is the methodological contribution of this study to the literature on negotiations. 
Indeed, research in this field has been criticized for adopting experimental settings involving 
students, often with limited or no working experience. Additionally, the experimental designs in 
negotiation research were often considered to be too far away from reality by practitioners. This 
study contributes to solve both issues. It investigated a sample of managers with an average of 
over twenty years of working experience. Additionally, it developed a novel approach to using 
scenarios and vignettes in negotiation research, by creating and validating an original case study 
and borrowing rigorous methodologies from other fields.   
Yet, the nature of this study was exploratory as it aimed to analyze a novel approach for 
integrative negotiations with novel methodologies. This resulted in both limitations and 
opportunities for future research and practice to build upon the results. For example, future 
research should analyze the effects of specific education and experience in negotiation, as results 
showed differences in perceptions between subjects with and without specific education or 
experience in negotiations. More research needs to be done to investigate the role played by 
personality factors in the perception of direct third party intervention. These results do not allow 
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for a systematic modeling of this issue. Finally, the use of the developed case study and similar 
methods with multiple and diverse samples could help in refining and strengthening the 
methodology as well as increasing our knowledge of how to overcome biases to reach integrative 
agreements. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1 – The third party direct intervention 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Extracts from the case 
 
Background Company A Second largest business of the town. Managerial mistakes, a large debt and technology 
obsolescence put the company in financial crisis, causing the company to laid off 50% of 
workforce, which increased the town’s economic recession. The company is now facing 
bankruptcy in one month. Only hope for the company, employees and the town is to be 
acquired. The stand-alone business has a negative value but if the company is integrated 
with a larger organization it would turn into a more profitable business. 
 Company B Leading company from the region. Because of its successful market strategies and its 
outstanding technology, the company has been growing over the last ten years. Yet, the 
company has a large debt used to acquire several small players. Company A would be a 
perfect fit from industrial perspective but the company does not have sufficient financial 
resources. 
Examples of 
biases  
Framing and 
Fixed-pie 
“But, there is only one problem”, thought Ted while shaving off on the morning of the 
meeting with Jim, “the money! We won’t have the money to pay for this company. 
 Anchoring Jim entered the room thinking, “I have no chance, I need this guy to pay our debt. That’s 
your goal, Jim you can do it”. 
 Self-serving Jim: “Once you integrate the companies, I am sure you will have so much cash flow to 
repay every single dollar of our debt.” 
Example of 
de-bias by 
TPDI 
Re-framing Mayor: “Listen to me, Jim. I understand that you want to focus just on one issue, the price, 
but by doing this you are missing other issues. You forget how this agreement could be a 
win-win situation for everyone.” 
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Table 2 - Zero-order correlation, reliability and means for personality factors. 
 
Zero-order correlation 
Variable Alpha Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Gender -   1       
2. Age -   -.30* 1      
3. Extraversion 0.67 4.71 1.39 .20 .01 1     
4. Agreeableness 0.23 5.24 1.10 -.01 .21 .08 1    
5. Conscientiousness 0.64 5.74 1.17 -.06 .20 -.27* .04 1   
6. Emotional stability 0.55 5.10 1.37 -.30* .33* -.33* .18 .44** 1  
7. Openness to experience 0.36 5.87 0.93 -.16 .21 .32* .11 -.19 -.08 1 
* p < 0.05 
** p > 0.01 
 
 
Table 3 - Value domains from Principal Components Factor Analysis 
 
Value domains for terminal values Marker values in order of the level of the factor loadings 
Claiming value  
(Part A: α = 0.773, M = 3.82, SD= 0.71; 
Part B: α = 0.625, M = 3.17, SD= 0.71) 
I think the parties’ orientation was competitive rather than collaborative. 
I think the parties tried to maximize own share of benefits, rather than to 
increase benefits for both sides. 
I think the parties focused more on positions than interests. 
Creating value  
(Part A: α = 0.709, M = 2.76, SD= 0.77; 
Part B: α = 0.509, M = 3.11, SD = 0.65) 
I think Jim is considering all the facets of the situation. 
I think Ted is considering all the facets of the situation. 
I think the parties focused more on positions than interests. (Reverse) 
Information fairness  
(Part A: α = 0.629, M = 3.23, SD = 0.66; 
Part B: α = 0.580, M = 3.54, SD = 0.56) 
I think the overall information disclosure was fair. 
I think Jim’s information disclosure was fair. 
I think Ted’s information disclosure was fair. 
Biased interpretation of information  
(Part A: α = 0.634, M = 2.90, SD = 0.64; 
Part B: α = 0.558, M = 2.98, SD = 0.58) 
I think Jim interpreted the information in a limited fashion. 
I think Ted interpreted the information in a limited fashion. 
I think Jim’s communication style is open. (Reverse) 
I think Ted’s communication style is open. (Reverse) 
Note: value domains obtained from principal components factor analysis with Varimax rotation. Cronbach’s alphas (α), mean 
scores (M) and standard deviations (SD) in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 4 – Mean comparisons for perceptions on the biased negotiation process. 
 
 TPDI   
Variable Before After t-test 2 tail sig. 
Claiming Value (CLV) 3.82 3.17 .000 
Creating Value (CRV) 2.76 3.11 .000 
Information Fairness (IF) 3.23 3.53 .000 
Biased Interpretation of Information (BII) 2.90 2.98 .332 
    
Situation likely to be solved 3.08 3.96 .000 
TPDI would be/was useful 3.98 4.25 .057 
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Table 5 – Result of the binary logistic regression. 
 
Variables in the equation     
 B S.E. Sig. Exp(B) 
Gender 0.67 0.327 0.031 1.954 
Education -0.275 0.122 0.011 0.759 
Working Experience 0.04 0.006 0 1.041 
Education or Experience in Negotiation -0.249 0.156 0.1 0.779 
Extraversion (EXT) -0.475 0.114 0 0.622 
Agreeableness (AGR) 0.391 0.19 0.024 1.479 
Conscientiousness (CON) 0.03 0.156 0.824 1.031 
Emotional stability (ES) -0.375 0.163 0.001 0.687 
Openness to experience (OPN) 0.109 0.196 0.56 1.115 
Constant 2.188 1.404 0.104 8.914 
Model statistics     
  N = 56 
  -2 Log likelihood = 61.072 
  Correct classification % = 72.7 
    
  Nagelkerke R2 = .199     
 
 
